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CONDEMNATION

OF RIPARIAN LANDS UNDER THE COMMERCE PoWER-The power of
the United States to regulate commerce comprehends a right to
control navigation and the means of navigation. To the extent
necessary for -the enjoyment of this power the government may
condemn .riparian property.1 The federal power of eminent
domain is limited by the mandate of the Fifth Amendment which
requires just compensation for private property taken for a public
use. Usually, the standard of just compensation is the market
value of the property, taking into consideration the most profitable
uses for which the property is suited and likely to be used2 at the
time of the taking,3 but not including any special value it may have
solely to the taker.4 By this test the market value of land riparian
to a navigable stream would seem to include the uses a ·riparian
owner can make of the river, including water rights and potential
hydroelectric uses of the river and adjacent land. However, in
United States v. Twin City Power Co./' the Supreme Court ruled
that the United States as condemner of riparian land on a navigable river need not pay the owner the value the lands have as a
power· dam site, even though the condemnee -held the land for
that purpose and the government took the land to build its own
dain. The Court said that the United States has a quasi-proprietary right in navigable waters, as against the owner of the river
bank, derived from its plenary power to regulate and control such
waters in aid of navigation.
·
That a riparian landowner may be deprived of a valuable
power dam site without compensation for loss of water rights is a
doctrine peculiar to federal condemnation suits. Justification for
l. U.S. CoNsr., art. I, §8. The power of eminent domain is implied and may be used
in. conjunction with the express powers of the United States. Kohl v. United States, 91
U.S. 367 (1875).
2 Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403 (1878).
3 Kerr v. South Park Commissioners, 117 U.S. 379 (1886). See 2 LEWIS, EMINENT
DOMAIN, 3d ed., 1220 (1909).
4 Boston Chamber ·of Commerce v. City of Boston, 217 U.S. 189 (1910); Kimball
Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1 (1949).
5 350 U.S. 222 (1956), reh. den. 350 U.S. 1009 (1956).
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such a result is found in the concept of a governmental right in
navigable waters. This interest supersedes the property rights of
individual landowners, and has the effect of making the general
rule applied in condemnation proceedings under the Fifth Amendment inapplicable to this type of case. The nature and scope of
the federal power in waterways is the key to understanding when
it is that the government must make compensation for riparian
property and what the measure of that compensation must be.

I.

The Extent of the Commerce Power in Navigable Waters

A. Generally. The power of Congress to control navigation
under the commerce clause was recognized at an early date. 6 This
regulatory right is absolute between the banks of a watercourse
and is limited only by the express restrictions of the Constitution.
There can be no objection when the United States asserts its power
to extend navigation by dredging channels, removing qbstacles to
navigation, or by raising water levels on navigable rivers to the
ordinary high water mark.7 The number of rivers subject to the
jurisdiction of Congress has been substantially increased by recent
decisions: For many years a river was part of interstate commerce
only if it was navigable in its ordinary condition.8 By this standard
a river was navigable if presently navigable, or if in the past it had
been navigable,9 or if by artificial means it had become navigable.10
Navigability is a matter of judicial determination and the standards of the ultimate conclusion are questions of mixed law and fact.
The scope of the navigation aspect of commerce control was extended in United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co.,11 in
which the Court held that "ordinary condition" referred to the
volume of water, flow, and grade of the.river bed. A waterway
may be navigable in law even though artificial aids are necessary
to make it navigable in fact. The present test of navigability requires an evaluation of the availability of a river for navigation,
taking into consideration its volume, flow, and grade, as well as
the cost of improvements necessary to make the river navigable
Gibbons v. 'Ogden, 9 Wheat. (22 U.S.) 1 at 189 (1824).
United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53 (1913); United
States v. Chicago, Milwaukee, Saint Paul and Pacific R. Co., 312 U.S. 592 (1941).
8 The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. (77 U.S.) 557 at 563 (1870).
9 Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423 (1931).
10 The Montello, 20 Wall. (87 U.S.) 430 (1874).
11311 U.S. 377 (1940).
6

7
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in fact.12 Whether any inland waterway is free from the power
of Congress is now in doubt. It has been held that the Tenth
Amendment is not a bar to the exercise of federal power in nonnavigable reaches of a river otherwise open to commercial uses,
and the power has been extended even to non-navigable tributaries
of a navigable stream.13
In earlier cases the Supreme Court took the view that the
federal power in navigable waters could be exercised only in aid
of navigation.14 The advent of comprehensive water resource
projects precipitated a judicial broadening of the scope of the
power,15 the Court adopting a position that all means having any
reasonable relation to the improvement of navigation were within
the means of the Federal Government.16 In 1940 the Court stated
in dictum that congressional power in navigable waters is as broad
as the needs of commerce,17 thus implying an extension of the rule.
Although this proposition has never been tested, it seems clear
that Congress does have power to use rivers for watershed improvement, reclamation, flood control and power plants independent of any conjectural aid to navigation.18
B. The Nature of the Federal Right. The exercise of a power
delegated to Congress is qualified by the requirement that just
compensation be paid for property directly taken,19 but this requireme~t does not extend to the destruction of private pr(')perty
in the bed of a river or bay resulting from an act authorized under
12 The courts have indicated that they will seldom overrule a determination by Congress that a river is navigable, although such a conclusion is ordinarily a judicial function.
Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423 (1931); Continental Land Co. v. United States, (9th
Cir. 1937) 88 F. (2d) 104, cert. den. 302 U.S. 715 (1937).
13 Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508 (1941); United States
v. Rio Grande Dam and Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690 (1898).
14 Port of Seattle v. Oregon and Washington R. Co., 255 U.S. 56 (1921); United Stares
v. River Rouge Improvement Co., 269 U.S. 411 (1926).
15 United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53 (1913), was the
first case to hold that the United States could sell surplus electric power from its dam to
recoup construction and maintenance costs. In Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Guy Atkinson
Co., 313 U.S. 508 (1941), the Supreme Court ruled it to be a matter of legislative discretion
to authorize a dam to be constructed w.,enty feet higher than necessary in order to provide
a power head.
16Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423 (1931).
17 United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940).
18 In Kansas v. Colorado, United States Intervenor, 206 U.S. 46 (1907), it was held
that the United States had no "inherent sovereign power" in navigable waters as would
permit an assertion of a federal right in a reclamation project. But see United States v.
Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725 (1950), where it was held that a reclamation project
was within the power of Congress as an exercise of the power to spend for the general
welfare.
19 Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312 (1893).
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the commerce power.20 Even though local law may leave the title
to the bed of a stream in the state or give it to the riparian owner,21
such title cannot be asserted against the absolute power of Congress to legislate for the improvement of navigation.22 Proprietary interests of the titleholder to the river bed are inferior and
subordinate to the paramount right of the United States.23 An
exercise of this power which results in damage to property in or
under the river is not a taking of private property but an exercise
of the power to which the property was always subservient.24 Thus,
the United States is said to have a "dominant servitude" in navigable waters.26 The courts have frequently used the term "dominant
servitude" as a means of describing the navigation right, yet no
one would suggest that Congress has a latent property interest in
all level ground such as would permit condemnation of land for a
military airport without compensation, and it seems illogical to
find that power to control navigation gives the government an
inherent property interest in rivers. The concept of a dominant
servitude in navigable waters is more closely analogous to the
principle that air space above the nation is public domain.26 Inasmuch as the air above a defined level is said to be free of all
claims of private ownership, it may be argued that all waterways
are similarly publicly owned. However, the cases requiring a
state to pay for property in a river bed are certainly inconsistent
with this rationale.27 A more plausible explanation of the quasiproprietary nature of the navigation power is that it is derived
from the common law rule that no landowner may own the flow
of a river.28 Thus the running waters must be, to some degree,
20 Lewis

Blue Point Oyster Cultivation Co. v. Briggs, 229 U.S. 82 (1913).
21 The title to beds of rivers within the state passed to the state on admission to the
Union, and the state may grant or reserve the title when the land is granted to private
owners. Fox River Paper Co. v. Railroad Commission of Wisconsin, 274 U.S. 651 (1927).
22 Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall. (70 U.S.) 713 (1865).
23 Gibson v. United States, 166 U.S. 269 (1897).
24 United States v. Chicago, Milwaukee, Saint Paul and Pacific R. Co., 312 U.S. 592
(1941).
25 "It is not the broad constitutional power to regulate commerce, but rather the
servitude derived from that power and narrower in scope, that frees the Government from
liability in these cases. When the Government exercises this servitude, it is exercising its
paramount power in the interest of navigation, rather than taking the private property
of anyone." United States v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 339 U.S. 799 at 808 (1950).
26 United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946); 2 NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN, lid ed.,
§5.781, p. 127 (1950).
27 Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403 (1878); Yates v. Milwaukee, IO Wall. (77 U.S.)
497 (1870).
28 " ••• [T]hat the running water in a great navigable stream is capable of private
ownership is inconceivable." United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229
U.S. 53 at 69 (1913). See 2 NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN, 3d ed., §5.79, p. 129 (1950).
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the property of the nation, and the nation may use these waters for
its own development free of private claims. Policy considerations
favoring more extensive development of water resources have undoubtedly inspired the sweeping implementation of this doctrine
in recent years. 29

II. Just Compensation to Riparian Owners
A: When Compensation is Required. Notwithstanding ·the
superior servitude of the government in navigable waters, the
states and individuals retain property interests therein. Absent
congressional action, both have a property interest in the bed of a
stream,30 and although private ownership of the running waters
of a river is impossible, usufructuary rights in the flow of water
may be recognized under state law as property.31 Assertion of
responsibility for proper use of water resources by the federal government has led to vast projects which seriously interfere with the
property interests of riparian owners. Not all such injuries are
compensable. When damage to land by reason of flooding or overflow is contemplated, the usual approach by the government is to
- attempt to purchase or condemn such land.32 However, water
. power projects necessarily result in unforeseen injury to upper
and lower riparian proprietors, and the landowner's suit for
damages becomes the only means of recovery in this case.33 Much
of the law of eminent domain rights stems from this type of informal condemnation.
The duty to make compensation arises from a taking by the
government. In direct condemnation suits this presents no problem, but individuals seeking to recover damages for injury to
property resulting from the establishment of water projects must
first establish that their property has been taken for public use.
The judicial approach to this question has been to use a reason29 See

notes 11-13 and 15-18 and adjacent text.
so A state may authorize improvement of navigable waters within its boundaries.
Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312 (1893). A state may appropriate water rights so long as there is no impairment of navigation. Kansas v. Colorado,
206 U.S. 46 (1907). On the question of state control of the rights of individuals in
streams, see I LEwIS, EMINENT DOMAIN, 3d ed., 116 (1909); 2 NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN,
3d ed., §5.7912, p. 141 (1950).
31 International Paper Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 399 (1931).
82 Condemnation suits are necessary in only a few direct takings. In the period 19331939 only 6.91% of the land necessary for TVA projects was condemned. 6 REP. T.V.A.
114 (1939).
33 The difficulties of suing the United States or its agencies are discussed in 16 TENN.
L REv. 801 (1939).

1956]

COMMENTS

277

ing which is essentially circular. A distinction is maintained between a "direct" injury and a "consequential" injury to property
interests. This is merely a statement of a legal conclusion. If the
damage is deemed to be "direct," there is a taking and the injury
is compensable.34 If the damage is not deemed to be compensable,
it is "consequential."35 Judicial inquiry regarding the compensable nature of the damage is directed to an examination of the
property itself, and not to any injury to pre-existing privileges of
the owner.36 Thus, while access to the navigable channel of a
river may be a valuable incident of riparian ownership, that property does not include a right of access because the servitude of the
government is imposed on all interests the land derives from the
river. Since riparian land is always servient to the right of the United
States, the land owner loses nothing which is compensable as a
result of a federal blocking of his former means of access.37 Under
this reasoning the court concludes that there has been no taking.
In effect, all that has been said is that nothing requiring compensation has been done and therefore there has been no taking.
Cases on the question of taking fall into two distinct groups:
those where injury is sustained by property interests in the stream,
and those where the injury is done to upper riparian land. The
proprietary nature of the federal navigation servitude controls the
conclusion in either case.

I. Injury to Interests in the Stream Bed. Injuries in the bed
of the stream are not takings. The navigation servitude includes
the whole of the bed of a river and subjects the land between
ordinary high water marks on a navigable river to congressional
control in aid of navigation.38 Title to the land and structures between high water marks is best described as defeasible. Any lawful
federal action which results in a diversion of the river, a loss of
land beneath the river, or of property on the river bottom is consequential.39 A riparian owner's property is not taken when his
34 United

States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445 (1903).
Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall. (70 U.S.) 713 (1865).
36 The just compensation clause of the Fifth Amendment protects property rights, not
the rights of the individual. Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312
(1893).
37 Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U.S. 141 (1900).
38 United States v. Chicago, Milwaukee, Saint Paul&: Pacific R. Co., 312 'u.s. 592 (1941).
so Contra, Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312 (1893). A state
chartered corporation built a lock and dam at the urging of the United States. When
federal authorities sought to condemn the structures it was held that the government
must pay for the structures and a state franchise to collect tolls, although earlier cases had
35
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oyster bed is damaged by dredging,40 or when the river is raised to
high water mark so as to flood permanently lands otherwise dry
for part of the year.41 He may be denied access to the river and
the subsequent decrease in the value of his real estate is damnum
absque injuria.42 A less stringent rule is applied to non-navigable
rivers. There the servitude of the government does not go beyond
the low water mark, and there is a t~ing when the water level is
raised above that mark. The landowner may demand compensation for a permanent flooding of the strip between low and high
water marks.43 However, one who erects a power dam at the confluence of a navigable and a non-navigable river which prevents
the backflow of water into the non-navigable river has no protected
interest in maintaining the differential le~els of the two rivers. 44
When the level of the non-navigable river is also raised and overflows the owner's farm land causing a loss in value for agricultural
purposes, there has been a taking.45
2. Injury to Upper Riparian Land. Injury to riparian upland
is usually caused by a permanent flooding or by temporary overflows. The cases uniformly hold that a permanent flooding of the
property is a taking requiring compensation.46 The whole fee to
the land need not be appropriated but the taking may be only that
of a flowage easement, in which case the condemnation award is
the difference in value of the lands before and after the easement
is imposed.47 If the uplands are subjected only to temporary overflows caused by interference in the regular flow of the river due
to a water project, the courts refuse to give a liberal interpretation
indicated this would be a non-compensable taldng. Later cases have, however, dismissed
this holding as resting on estoppel. See Omnia Commercial Co. v. United States, 261 U.S.
502 (1923).
40 Lewis Blue Point Oyster Cultivation Co. v. Briggs, 229 U.S. 82 (1913).
il United States v. Chicago, Milwaukee, Saint Paul 8: Pacific R. Co., 312 U.S. 592 (1941).
-!2 Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U.S. 141 (1900); United States v. Commodore Park Inc.,

324 U.S. 386 (1945).
43 United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917).
44 United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499 (1945). This case was thought
to overrule or limit United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917), but see note 45 infra.
45 United States v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 339 U.S. 799 (1950). The only distinguishable difference between this case and the Willow River case is that the power dam
of the Willow River Power Co. blocked the rise of the non-navigable river. The dissent
in the Kansas City case pointed out that the landowner was asserting a right to have the
Mississippi River maintained below the high water mark. See 18 UNIV. CHL L. REv. 355
(1951).
40 United States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445 (1903); Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 13 Wall.
(80 U.S.) 166 (1871).
'
47 United States v. 2,648.31 Acres of Land, (4th Cir. 1955) 218 F. (2d) 518.
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to the term "taking." The navigation servitude concept does not
apply to damage beyond the banks of the river,48 but the narrow
common law principle that ownership requires complete physical
possession of the "thing" has survived to implement a very restricted view as to when property has been taken. There must be
a more or less complete ouster of possession by the invasion of
flood waters to constitute a "taking" by the government.49 Where
the invasion is less than permanent the courts also say that any injury resulting from the lawful exercise of a governmental power
is merely consequential.50 This is but another application of the
circular approach so often used in this type of case. Among the
reasons frequently given by the courts in finding that there has
been no compensable taking are that the government's action is
not the proximate cause of the damage,51 that the injury could not
be foreseen, 52 or that the government has no duty to protect a landowner from damage by maintaining a river at a level at which the
owner's means of self protection are sufficient.53
It is readily apparent that if all claims of damage to riparian
lands caused in part by the development of water control projects
were to be regarded as compensable, the cost of improvements
would rise tremendously. The Fifth Amendment, however, requires compensation if it can be said there was a "taking," and the
physical concept of ownership should have no place in determining whether a riparian owner has suffered a compensable loss. A
better approach would be to recognize that even temporary lessening of the owner's beneficial use of land is a taking when caused
by governmental acts. An analogous situation was presented in
United States v. Causby,54 where frequent low flights of military
aircraft over plaintiff's land caused a diminution in property value
and were held to amount to an imposition of a servitude on plaintiff's usable air space. It was held that this was a "taking," and
that _a suit for compensation ·could be maintained in the Court of
48 This does not mean that the servitude does not have an influence on the measure
of damages when upland has been taken. See text at II-B infra.
49 Transportation Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635 (1878).
50 Jackson v. United States, 230 U.S. 1 (1913); West Chicago Street R. Co. v. Illinois
ex rel. Chicago, 201 U.S. 506 (1906).
51 Bedford v. United States, 192 U.S. 217 (1904); Christman v. United States, (7th
Cir. 1934) 74 F. (2d) 112.
52 John Horstmann Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 138 (1921).
53 Jackson v. United States, 230 U.S. 1 (1913).
M 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
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Claims.GI! This broad interpretation of "taking" would seem to
be equally applicable to riparian land overflowed at regular
periods because of a downstream dam. Although the situations
are not completely analogous,G 6 the Causby case would seem to
open the door to a more liberal approach to the intermittent overflow problem.
B. Just Compensation. The Fifth Amendment requires just
compensation for property taken to a public use. The measure of
that compensation which is "just" is usually expressed as the "fair
market value" of the property.57 Numerous tests have been
devised to determine this measure, and, while these tests are applicable to riparian condemnations, the factors subjected to the
test of fair market value differ from those involved in ordinary
takings.Gs From the landowner's point of view, the value of his
property is enhanced by the availability of a body of water. In
spite of common law and statutory restrictions on his use of that
water,59 an adjacent river or lake does increase land values in
private sales. A purchaser may desire water rights for power,
wharfage, factory or resort purposes. Nevertheless, as the Court's
decision in United States v. Twin City Power Co. 60 indicates, the
test of "what a willing buyer would pay a willing seller" 61 is not
the applicable standard of value when the United States condemns
riparian property.
Riparian uplands are most often taken under the eminent
domain power for the use of the United States as fast lands62 for
federal power dams. Since compensation is always necessary when
land is to be permanently flooded, the issue in such cases is the
measure of compensation to be used. An award could be based
on the value of the land as a power dam site, or could be based
only on its value for inland purposes. The federal courts have
been consistent in ruling that dam site values are to be excluded
55 Suits against the United States in the Court of Claims to recover for a taking must
qualify under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. (1952) §1491. See 16 TENN. L. REv. 801 (1939).
56 As a practical matter, Causby had lost all use of the invaded air space, whereas a
riparian owner may have beneficial use of his land between overflows. Also, the flights
were much more frequent than intermittent floodings would ordinarily be.
571 ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER THE LAw OF EMINENT DOMAIN, 2d ed., 56 (1953).
58 Ibid. Orgel does not consider the effect of the federal servitude in riparian condemnations, but explains those decisions on the basis of ordinary valuation rules.
li9 Since 1899, e.g., it has been illegal for individuals to build structures in navigable
waters without federal permission. 30 Stat. 1151 (1899).
oo 350 U.S. 222 (1956), reh. den. 350 U.S. 1009 (1956).
61 New York v. Sage, 239 U.S. 57 (1915).
62 Fast lands are those lands which will be flooded by waters impounded behind a dam.
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from the property valuation when the United States condemns
land to aid navigation. Two overlapping lines of reasoning, however, have been used to support this conclusion.
A number of cases have been decided on the basis of settled
principles of ascertaining "fair market value" set forth in other
eminent domain cases. They hold that the value did not include
power site value,63 and, conceivably, all condemnation cases involving riparian land might be rested on these principles. The
fair market value may include the "highest and most profitable
use for which the property is adaptable and needed or likely to be
needed in the reasonably near future." 64 This measure is tempered by the requirement that only those uses available to the
present owner may be considered as contributing to the value of
the property. 611 A possible special value to the taker is not to be
part of the award. Thus, when a large quantity of fast land is required to hold the flood waters of a dam, the owner of a relatively
small plot cannot claim that his land had a foreseeable future use
as a dam site. Even if a landowner has property ideally situated
for dam purposes, and owns enough land for that purpose, so that
there is a real possible use for dam purposes, his right to build a
dam is merely conditional, as it is perfected only by the grant of a
federal license. If that license were refused, the owner would no
longer have the opportunity to use his land for a power dam and
the value-to-the-owner test would reflect this limitation. It could
be argued that the lands are still available for power dam purposes
and therefore the test of available uses should be applied. Only
the government could avail itself of the land for power purposes,
however, and it is a settled rule that a value available only for
public use is not part of the owner's compensation award. 66
The more predominant group of cases, however, hold that it is
the federal dominant servitude which precludes the allowance of
value as a power site. The navigation servitude bars the landowner's assertion of any value derived from water rights. Just as
title to the river bed and usufructuary rights in the flow are subject to defeasance without compensation at the instance of the
63 United States ex rel. TVA v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266 (1943) (non-navigable river);
Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246 (1934); Continental Land Co. v. United States, (9th
Cir. 1937) 88 F. (2d) 104, cert. den. 302 U.S. 715 (1937).
64 Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246 at 255 (1934).
65 Kimball Laundry v. United States, 338 U.S. 1 (1949).
66 United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369 (1943); United States v. Cors, 337 U.S. 325
(1949).
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government, when the United States takes the land as well as the
river for a public use, the water flowing over the river bed adds
no compensable value to the land.61
It is not quite accurate to say that these two groups of cases are
clearly defined. Nearly all the decisions use both approaches to
reach the conclusion that fast lands can have no flood land value.
It is notable that the courts have often seemed unsure of their
ground and preferred to use a valuation approach. This confusion is apparently due to the somewhat inconsistent positions
taken by the Court in United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water
Power Co.68 where the United States sought to condemn the lands
of four power companies for the expansion of the Sault Sainte
-Marie ship canals. Two questions relevant to this discussion were
involved. The Supreme Court held (1) that riparian uplands
held as a factory site have no additional value derived from the
hydroelectric potential in the fall of the river, and (2) that the
government must pay the prospective value of land which was
ideally suited for a water lock and which was certain to be used
for that purpose. It would seem that both issues presented substantially similar questions. The ruling that lands could not
reflect additional value from their potential use for power purposes was primarily based on the principle that a riparian owner's
private property interest in the river is subservient to the complete
dominion of the government between the banks of the river. The
Court also relied upon the "value to the owner" concept in this
part of the decision. In reaching its conclusion on the other
branch of the case, i.e., that the award should include the land's
value for lock purposes, the Court appears to have overlooked a
possible application of the navigation servitude. The lock-land
award was based on the rule that it is permissible to consider that
land has a value for a public purpose. 69 The separate parts of the
holding are irreconcilable, unless it is upon the ground that the
value for lock purposes was not dependent on the power potential
of the river, whereas the factory value of the upland was grounded
on the prospective use of the river fall for electricity. Certainly
the Court overlooked the "value to owner" concept in the lock61 United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53 (1913); United
States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222 (1956), reh. den. 350 U.S. 1009 (1956).
68 229 U.S. 53 (1913).
69 Cf. Clark's Ferry Bridge Co. v. Public Service Commission of Pennsylvania, 291 U.S.
W (1934). See also note 66 supra.
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land award, for it is doubtful if the provisions of the Rivers and
Harbors Act of 189970 would permit an owner to build locks himself.
The Chandler-Dunbar decision is most notable for the Court's
application of the navigation servitude to diminish the value of
the award for uplands. The Court said at page 66: " ... [T]he
Government cannot be justly required to pay for an element of
value which did not inhere in these parcels as upland. The Government had dominion over the water power of the rapids and
falls and cannot be required to pay any hypothetical additional
value to a riparian owner who had no right to appropriate the
current to his own commercial.use." This has been the controlling
principle in the valuation of riparian fast lands since the case was
decided in 1913. The navigation servitude does not extend beyond the high water mark of the stream in determining whether
or not there has been a taking, but it does extend to the uplands
in the sense that no compensable value is derived from the river
flow when the land is condemned by the United States. Fair
market value of fast land is to be measured without regard to the
uses which the owner might have made of the river itself.71 Although the courts frequently rest their decisions on other valuation rules, no holding on navigable rivers72 has been contrary to
this.73 Valuation of fast lands, according to Chandler-Dunbar
principles, depends wholly on the proprietary aspect of the federal
right in navigable waters, and this is precisely the basis of the
reasoning in the Twin City decision.
The Twin City case marks the end of an apparent retreat from
this position which was evident in intervening cases. The most
'10 Note 59 supra. 1 0RGEL, VALUATION UNDER THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN, 2d ed.,
359, n. 38 (1953), suggests the Court did not pay sufficient attention to this award because of the small amount of money involved.
71 In United States v.Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222 (1956), reh. den. 350 U.S.
1009 (1956), the land was finally valued at $37 an acre for agricultural purposes. The
commissioners had originally set its value at $267.02 per acre as power site land.
'12 United States ex rel. TVA v. Powelson, (4th Cir. 1943) 138 F. (2d) 343, cert. den.
321 U.S. 773 (1944), on remand from 319 U.S. 266 (1943), allowed riparian land value to
include some elements of power site value, but this was a non-navigable river. In Grand
River Dam Authority v. Grand Hydro, 335 U.S. 359 (1948), a federal licensee was required
to pay the power site value of riparian land. This too was a non-navigable river and the
Court expressly left the question open as to whether the United States would have to pay
such value.
'13 United States v. 2,979.72 Acres of Land, (4th Cir. 1955) 218 F. (2d) 524, requiring
the United States to condemn a flowage easement which was owned by a power company,
with the fee in a third party, was reversed sub nom. United States v. Virginia Electric
and Power Co., 350 U.S. 956 (1956).
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noticeable inroads on the servitude concept were made in Federal
Power Commission v. Niagara Mohawk Power Co.,74 and United
States v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co.76 Neither case involved valuation of fast lands, but the language of both opinions indicated that
the Court was unwilling to rely on the proprietary nature of the
federal navigation power where the government's acts interfered
with the property of individuals. In the Niagara Power case it was
held that the Federal Power Act had not destroyed state recognized
usufructuary rights in the flow of a river, and that the United
States could be compelled to pay for these rights. This was a matter of statutory interpretation, but the dissenting opinion of Justice Douglas pointed out that the government was being forced to
pay for something which the Court had previously said was owned
by the United States. The Kansas City Life Ins. case is most noteworthy for the statement that the navigation servitude extends no
further than the banks of a navigable river. The effect of this case
was to rule that a lawful raising of a navigable river to its high
water mark amounted to a taking when water was backed up a
non-navigable river. Justice Douglas, joined in dissent by three
-0ther justices, protested that the effect of the servitude was nullified if it did not exonerate the government of all damage incurred
:as a result of a lawful rise in a navigable water level.
The tone of the opinion in Twin City indicates that a majority
of the Court have returned to the view of the Dunbar-Chandler
case. The Court holds in no uncertain terms that Congress, by
reason of its plenary regulatory power in all waters affecting interstate commerce, has a proprietary servitude in those waters. No
private owner may assert his title against the United States when
it is acting in aid of navigation, and riparian land cannot derive
value from the possible uses the owner might have made of that
water.

III. Conclusion
The Twin City decision leaves several questions unanswered.
One of the most pressing of these is whether or not the proprietary
nature of the federal servitude may be applied when the government's acts with regard to a stream are not in aid of navigation.
The servitude doctrine was developed at a time when all water
development was directed toward improvement of navigation.
74 347

76 339

U.S. 239 (1954).
U.S. 799 (1950).
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Statements often appear that the quasi-proprietary aspect of the
servitude is limited to acts done for navigation alone.76 However,
expansion of federal power in this area on the basis of the power
to promote commerce generally,77 as well as certain powers derived
from the ability to spend for the general welfare,78 raise the question as to whether the application of the servitude doctrine will
be so limited. It is unlikely that an answer will be forthcoming in
the immediate future. Congress has always phrased its acts relating
to rivers and harbors so as to include navigation as a purpose,79
and the role of the judiciary ih determining the wisdom of congressional action is very limited.80 When the question is brought
to the Court, it is likely that it will be resolved in favor of extending the proprietary servitude to all means in aid of commerce as a
whole. Federal power in navigable rivers is only a part of the
commerce power. The servitude seems to have been imposed on
rivers because they are highways of commerce, and thus it would
be unreasonable to restrict the government's property interest in
running waters to navigation alone. An early lower court decision
which has been cited by the Supreme Court lends strength to this
view.81
A different approach is required to enable the government to
use riparian property for welfare purposes without liability for
just compensation. Although rivers are highways of commerce, it
is difficult to say they are also tools of public welfare. Federal
taking of rivers and fast land for such non-commercial purposes as
reclamation projects would be an exercise of its powers to implement under the necessary and proper clause the express power to
spend for the public welfare. Unless the Court were to go further
than it has ever gone before and declare the navigable waters of
76 Note

14 supra.
States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940).
78 United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725 (1950).
79 In the Twin City case the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit based its decision
to award power site value to the respondent on the ground that the federal dam could not
aid navigation because it would block the river. United States v. Twin City Power Co.,
(5th Cir. 1955) 221 F. (2d) 299. The Supreme Court reversed this finding.
80 Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); United States ex rel. TVA v. Welch, 327 U.S.
546 (1946).
81 Stock.ton v. Baltimore and New York R. Co., (D.C. N.J. 1887) 32 F. 9, app. dismissed 140 U.S. 699 (1891), was cited with approval in Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U.S. 141
(1900). The Stock.ton case held that a taking of river bottom for a bridge pier was in aid
of commerce and was not compensable. But see Iriarte v. United States, (1st Cir. 1948)
166 F. (2d) 800, cert. den. 335 U.S. 816 (1948), where, in connection with a condemnation
of harbor land under the military powers of Congress, it was held proper to consider the
possible use of the land for docks and terminals.
11 United
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the country to be in the public domain for all lawful federal purposes, the property facet of the navigation servitude would not
seem to cover the exercise of a naked constitutional power resulting
in the derogation of a private interest. Some members of the present Supreme Court, however, have indicated that they would hold
otherwise. Justices Black and Douglas have intimated that, in
their opinion, the right of the United States in waterways is absolute. The Twin City opinion places great reliance on the principle
that there can be no private ownership in the flow of a river. The
cases to date have said only that the river cannot be owned by an
individual as· against the superior right of the United States to
improve navigation. The willingness that the Court has displayed
to extend the scope of the federal power in rivers warrants the conclusion that the next step may be to extend the proprietary aspect
of the power to be as sweeping as the power itself.
·

George F. Lynch, S.Ed.

